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I. INTRODUCTION 
In his target article1 for this symposium celebrating Michael Risinger, 
Bill Thompson expertly covers a lot of ground regarding the communication 
of forensic science evidence to laypeople.  Among other things, it details and 
critiques various presentation formats that could be, and have been, used by 
forensic scientists.  It also notes various paradigms that have been used to 
study how laypeople understand and use that evidence. 
In this Article, I focus on alternative forms of explanation that might 
improve laypeople’s understanding of forensic comparison evidence.2  As 
we consider how to best communicate with factfinders, we need to reflect on 
our beliefs about what they need to understand to make a good decision and 
what they are likely to understand from various types of presentation.  I 
conclude that rather than attempt to teach factfinders how to do the 
mathematics involved in forensic statistical reasoning, we should tap into 
knowledge they already have to develop alternative ways of getting to the 
“right” conclusions. 
The major sections below do the following: Part II describes some 
reasons why we should not torture jurors (or judges) with lessons in statistics.  
It refers to some arguments that Thompson made and adds some new ones.  
Part III notes some misconceptions that laypeople have about forensic 
analysis and some general principles about the psychology of explanation.  
Part IV illustrates four possible ways to promote better judgments involving 
forensic comparison evidence without ever saying “likelihood ratio” or 
“random match probability” or “Bayes’ Theorem”: attribute substitution, 
explanation, analogy, and implicit learning tasks. 
II. LEAVE THE STATISTICS AND JARGON TO THE EXPERTS (AND STOP 
TORTURING THE JURORS) 
There are a bunch of reasons why one should not try to explain to a jury 
(or judge) the excruciating details of likelihood ratios or random match 
probabilities.  And there are also a bunch of reasons not to use the jargon of 
forensic science. 
 
 
 1  William C. Thompson, How Should Forensic Scientists Present Source Conclusions?, 
48 SETON HALL L. REV. 773 (2018).   
 2  I had wanted to allude to the Far Side cartoon (See Gary Larson, Cartoon of What We 
Say to Dogs, THE FAR SIDE COMIC STRIP, https://www.pinterest.com/pin/26585318422380
2510/), depicting a man lecturing his dog about staying out of the garbage while the dog hears 
merely a lot of noise interspersed with her name (Ginger).  However, Dawn McQuiston-
Surrett and Michael J. Saks beat me to it with the title of their paper: The Testimony of 
Forensic Identification Science: What Expert Witnesses Say and What Factfinders Hear, 33 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 436 (2009).   
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A. Our Numbers Are Not Exact So We Should Not Pretend They Are, 
Nor Should We Use Non-Statistical Language That Suggests They 
Are 
Forensic scientists are often concerned with conveying very large (or 
very small) exact numbers—typically probabilities or likelihoods—to jurors.  
Many studies using vignettes (or videos) with between-subject mock juror 
judgments, where different people have different amounts of information, 
show that jurors do not use such forensic evidence in a statistically consistent 
or appropriate manner.3  At least for now, we should not worry about such 
findings.  First, as Thompson notes in his target article,4 the science behind 
the numbers is not so well-developed that we can be sure the numbers are 
even close to accurate.  Second, people are likely to overweight seemingly 
precise numerical values, at least when they are presented by a human 
communicator (rather than by, for example, a computer message).5 
Rather than use numbers, forensic scientists often use words like 
“individualization” and “match.”  As Thompson notes, these are dangerous 
terms, and are likely to be overvalued.6 The problem is that laypeople 
(sensibly) believe that these terms mean there is exactly one person whose 
prints they could be.  In a laboratory study that varied fingerprint examiner 
terminology, participants who were told that a fingerprint was 
“individualized,” were much more likely to think the defendant was the one 
who left the prints at the scene than were participants who were told that the 
fingerprint was individualized but that “it is possible that the print in question 
could have come from someone else.”7 
 
 3  See generally Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA 
Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 859 (1996); 
Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and 
Expectancies, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1999); Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, 
Mock Jurors’ Use of Error Rates in DNA Database Trawls, 37 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 424 
(2013).  But see William C. Thompson & Eryn J. Newman, Lay Understanding of Forensic 
Statistics: Evaluation of Random Match Probabilities, Likelihood Ratios, and Verbal 
Equivalents, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 332 (2015) (presenting data showing that mock jurors’ 
probabilistic judgments sometimes approximate Bayesian norms).   
 4  Thompson, supra note 1, at 778–81.   
 5  See Y. Charles Zhang & Norbert Schwarz, The Power of Precise Numbers: A 
Conversational Logic Analysis, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 944 (2013).   
 6  Thompson, supra note 1, at 797. 
 7  Gregory Mitchell & Brandon Garrett, The Impact of Proficiency Testing on the Weight 
Given to Fingerprint Evidence (Nov. 1, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Seton Hall Law Review).  See also Jonathan J. Koehler, When are People Persuaded by DNA 
Match Statistics?, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 493 (2001) (showing that presenting information 
using frequencies rather than probabilities makes it easier for people to imagine that the print 
came from someone other than the suspect).  The recognition that someone else could be the 
source of fingerprints leads some people to fall prey to the “Defense Attorney’s Fallacy”—
the belief that if multiple people could be the source, then the evidence is worthless.  See 
William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in 
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Using legal terms that have a different meaning from their common 
non-legal meaning can create problems.  For example, mock jurors’ prior 
knowledge of crimes (e.g., believing, falsely, that to be guilty of burglary a 
person must be armed and must take property) will influence how they label 
a crime vignette, even when judges provide instructions with the full legal 
definition.  Telling mock jurors to disregard their prior knowledge did not 
help much; however, instructions that reviewed their false beliefs and tried 
to replace them with true information did improve decisions.8 
B. The Possibility of Mistake 
Worrying about communicating precise small numbers indicating a 
“match” is unnecessary due to the always-greater probability of an error 
somewhere in the obtaining, handling, or evaluation of the sample.  Although 
study participants do not always integrate error information well, when 
participants learned about the chances of a coincidental match and the 
chances of two types of mistakes—lab error and planted evidence—they did 
use Bayesian updating in assessing the source probability for DNA evidence 
(although not for shoeprint evidence).9  Participants have also used 
knowledge of results of an examiner’s proficiency testing to adjust the 
weight given to fingerprint evidence.10 
C. Likelihood Ratios and Random Match Probabilities Are Terrible 
Ways to Present Information to Actual Human Beings 
Likelihood ratios, random match probabilities, and some other 
proposed ways of conveying statistical information to factfinders rely on 
computing the probability of obtaining the particular evidence given a 
particular hypothesis.  It is futile to try to explain anything that involves 
p(e|h)—the probability of evidence given a hypothesis—to anyone in an 
hour, or in a day, or even in a semester of an undergraduate college course 
in Research Methods and Statistics. 
Surveys of psychology academics who rely on p-values for decisions 
about significance reveal that a large percentage (90% of those not teaching 
methods) makes common errors when trying to explain what a p-value 
 
Criminal Trials: The Prosecutors’ Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy, 11 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987).   
 8  See Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the 
Law, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507 (1993); Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay 
Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857 (1991).   
 9  See Thompson & Newman, supra note 3.   
 10  See Mitchell & Garrett, supra note 7.  The experience of the examiner was also shown 
to matter in Jonathan J. Koehler, N. J. Schweitzer, Michael J. Saks & Dawn McQuiston, 
Science, Technology, or Examiner Experience: What Influences Jurors’ Judgments about 
Forensic Science Testimony?, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 401 (2016).   
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represents.  They are likely to say that p is the probability that given the data, 
the null hypothesis (of no difference between means), is true.  That is (in a 
world of two exclusive/exhaustive hypotheses), they believe that 1-p 
represents the likelihood that their own hypothesis is true given the data—a 
form of p(h|e).  But . . . alas, no.  A p-value represents the probability of 
getting the data (or, rather, data that is as extreme or more extreme than the 
data obtained) given that the null hypothesis is true—a form of p(e|h).  If 
academic researchers who have worked with p-values for years, and are 
invested in understanding them, cannot get it right, there is little hope for 
factfinders.11 
The problem is, of course, that p(e|h) is not what people want to know.  
The statistic gets (unintentionally) reinterpreted, typically by way of the 
Prosecutor’s Fallacy12 or the Source Probability Error13 into something that 
factfinders believe is useful. 
D. (Almost) All Evidence is Statistical Anyway 
The debate about whether jurors should have to deal with probabilities/
statistics is not one worth having.  Jurors already do.  The reliability of every 
piece of evidence and every witness is in play—and we can think of that as 
invoking jurors’ statistical sensibilities.  Is this witness likely to be lying 
under these circumstances?  How likely?  What are the chances that installing 
a safety device would have prevented the accident?  We accept that jurors 
must deal with this kind of uncertainty.14  We also ask them to make 
judgments that are “more likely than not”—which certainly sound like we 
expect them to assess probabilities. 
Why do we think forensics is special?  Perhaps we think it is special 
because it is “scientific” and jurors typically do not understand how it works.  
Perhaps we think it is special because it involves some numerical concepts 
and we know that many people are innumerate or afraid of math. 
But maybe instead of worrying so much about how to present exact 
statistics, we should think more about what people already know and how to 
leverage it so that they can make better judgments when dealing with 
 
 11  The data are from Heiko Haller & Stefan Krauss, Misinterpretations of Significance: 
A Problem Students Share with their Teachers, 7 METHODS PSYCHOL. RES. 1 (2002).  For a 
broader discussion and overview of the relevant data, see Blakeley B. McShane & David Gal, 
Statistical Significance and the Dichotomization of Evidence, 112 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 885 
(2017).  McShane and Gal misleadingly describe the Haller and Krauss study as if it had been 
done by Gerd Gigerenzer in Mindless Statistics, 33 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 587 (2004).  Id. 
 12  See Thompson & Schumann, supra note 7.   
 13  See Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA 
Evidence, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (1993).   
 14  “[M]ost knowledge, and almost all legal evidence, is probabilistic.” DePass v. United 
States, 721 F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting).   
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forensic statistics. 
III. MISCONCEPTIONS AND EXPLANATION 
To think about how forensic science might best be communicated to 
factfinders, we should consider what psychological science has discovered 
about explaining and teaching complex concepts generally.  We should also 
consider what preconceptions and misconceptions factfinders might have at 
the start.  And, of course, we should recognize that we (e.g., anyone who can 
read and understand Thompson’s target article) are unlikely to be able to 
gauge what jurors will understand; our intuitions are blown, we suffer from 
the “curse of knowledge.”  The “curse of knowledge” refers to a 
psychological experimental finding that people are likely to misattribute 
their estimates of the ease of a task (e.g., understanding forensic statistics) to 
features of the task itself rather than appropriately to their own prior 
knowledge or experience.15  To experts, too much seems too easy. 
A. Misconceptions Needing Repair 
People are likely to have several misconceptions about the forensic 
disciplines.  For example, I suspect that people have (at least) four important 
misconceptions about fingerprints.  First, most laypeople believe that every 
person has unique fingerprints.  In two samples, involving more than 1,200 
Amazon Turk workers, about 95% of US respondents indicated belief that 
fingerprints are unique.16  It might be useful to tell factfinders that forensic 
scientists do not actually know whether people have unique-as-snowflakes 
fingerprints. 
A second misconception is that if there is a latent print, it can be used 
to identify a source.  People do not seem to realize that there are often partial 
and degraded prints that do not provide enough information to be useful and 
that even prints that pass a minimum threshold still vary in the amount of 
information they contain. 
The third and most important misconception is not about between-
person variability of prints but rather is about within-person variability of 
prints.  I expect that most people believe that every time a source leaves a 
fingerprint, it will look remarkably “the same”.  Although I do not have 
reliable data, this guess comes not only from the ease with which fingerprint 
hits occur on television (often with a lovely computer lightshow accentuating 
 
 15  See Colleen M. Kelley & Larry L. Jacoby, Adult Egocentrism: Subjective Experience 
Versus Analytic Bases for Judgment, 35 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 157 (1996).   
 16  Brandon Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, How Jurors Evaluate Fingerprint Evidence: The 
Relative Importance of Match Language, Method Information, and Error Acknowledgment, 
10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 484 (2013).  In another study sample, 84.3% of participants 
indicated that they believed fingerprints were unique.  Mitchell & Garrett, supra note 7.   
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the “match”) but also from years of watching the faces of students when I 
say to them: “Every time you lay down a fingerprint it is different in some 
way from every other one you have ever produced.”  This fact startles the 
students and I do give them more explanation (see Part IV, Section B, 
below). 
A fourth misconception—or, perhaps, something most people do not 
think of unless reminded—is that there are many different potential types of 
errors in the process—including in procurement, laboratory testing, or 
reporting of results. 
If I am correct, these are specific misconceptions that need to be 
repaired early during the explanation of fingerprint evidence.  But the 
misconceptions (or true knowledge) that factfinders bring to the courtroom 
are likely to vary from one forensic discipline to another.  For example, 
Thompson and Newman17 show that participants responded differently to the 
same probability information when framed as DNA evidence versus 
shoeprint evidence.  As mentioned above, people cannot help but bring their 
own pre-existing knowledge to reasoning tasks; it is likely that their 
experience with shoes as opposed to DNA made them less responsive to the 
expert’s shoeprint testimony. 
B. Explanation in General 
Plenty of psychology research (so much that I cannot think of a 
prototypical cite offhand) has shown that people will remember, understand, 
and be more likely to use information when they are given an explanation 
for it.  It is one thing to tell people that something is the case; it is another to 
give an explanation that shows why or how it became the case.  As a simple 
example, you could try to teach someone to remember the numbers in this 
sequence: 1, 8, 27, 64, 125.  Memorizing, reciting, or quickly coming up with 
the sixth number of the sequence is difficult until one is told (or induces) that 
the sequence is of integers cubed.  The explanation (here a rule) makes it 
possible to regenerate the sequence and connect it to information that is 
already known. 
People are better at solving problems when they understand the 
rationale (i.e., have an explanation) for the relationship between elements of 
the problem.18  Explanations also benefit from having multiple examples 
 
 17  Thompson & Newman, supra note 3.  Shoeprint testimony was shown to have had 
little effect on mock jurors’ decisions in Kristy A. Martire, Richard I. Kemp, Ian Watkins, 
Malindi A. Sayle & Ben R. Newell, The Expression and Interpretation of Uncertain Forensic 
Science Evidence: Verbal Equivalence, Evidence Strength, and the Weak Evidence Effect, 37 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 197 (2013).   
 18  For example, in the now-famous Wason Selection Task, first described in P.C. Wason, 
Reasoning About a Rule, Q.J. EXP. PSYCHOL. 273 (1968), participants are told about a deck of 
cards, each with a letter on one side and a number on the other.  They are shown four cards: 
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rather than relying on merely one example.  From those many examples, 
people can abstract underlying principles or rules that would apply in other 
appropriately similar situations.19 
IV. APPLICATIONS TO UNDERSTANDING LIKELIHOOD RATIOS 
Below I describe four techniques that could be useful in helping 
factfinders grasp statistical concepts important to understanding comparison 
evidence.  Note that I do not believe that the exact statistics necessarily need 
to be reported after this knowledge (or intuition) is developed.  Rather, each 
of these techniques might give factfinders a sense of how to use forensic 
evidence, presented in whatever form (words or numbers), to appropriately 
adjust their beliefs. 
A. Attribute Substitution 
Beginning in the 1960’s and 1970’s, psychological science had to admit 
that human decision-making was not “rational,” in that it does not follow the 
laws of logic or probability.  In the subsequent tidal wave of hundreds of 
studies, human decision makers were shown to make errors or reveal biases 
in judgment.20  An important insight, however, was that the errors or biases 
were not random; rather, they were systematic, thus revealing some 
principles underlying human reasoning processes. 
A good explanation for why and how people give systematic but 
irrational answers to statistical questions is this: if someone thinks a question 
is too hard, or does not know the answer, or does not have time or mental 
resources to answer it, he or she will find an easier related question and 
answer that.  So, for example, when people are asked whether there are more 
deaths from airplane or automobile accidents per year, and answer the 
former, it is because they do not know the true answer and so substitute the 
question: “Which do I hear more about?”21  Here, they are substituting 
 
E K 4 7.  They are told there is a rule for the cards: if there is a vowel on one side then there 
is an even number on the other.  Then they are asked which cards must be turned over to 
ensure that the rule is followed.  In this standard variant of the task, most participants err by 
choosing only the E to turn over, and not acknowledging that the 4 must be turned over as 
well.  An analysis of the many variants of the tasks used suggests that understanding the 
rationale for the rule is key to getting the problem correct.  Patricia W. Cheng & J. Holyoak, 
Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas, 17 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 391 (1985).   
 19  With regard to using multiple examples in analogical reasoning, see Mary L. Gick & 
Keith J. Holyoak, Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer, 15 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1 
(1980).   
 20  For a brief history and overview of this research, see Barbara A. Spellman & Simone 
Schnall, Embodied Rationality, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 117 (2009).  For a compendium of the early 
research, see Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kahneman, Paul 
Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).   
 21  The true answer, of course, is that there are more automobile-related deaths per year.  
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familiarity for information (using the “availability heuristic”). 
But, attribute substitution works to give the correct answer much of the 
time.  For example, when asked “which has more earthquakes, California or 
New York?” substituting “which do I hear more about?” gives the correct 
answer.  Accordingly, maybe there is something that can be used to replace 
forensic statistics that would give the right answer most of the time. 
Although he does not use these terms, or use it for this purpose, Michael 
Risinger presents an interesting idea about attribute substitution in his article 
called “Leveraging Surprise.”22  His article suggests that surprise could be 
used as a way of measuring how much people believe alleged facts.  For 
example, the more you are surprised to learn that a “fact” is false, the more 
you must have previously believed it.  Risinger wants to apply the surprise 
test to standards of proof.  For example, “I’d be extremely EXTREMELY 
surprised to learn that the defendant was not the perpetrator” might be a good 
expression of belief beyond a reasonable doubt.  Ginther and Cheng23 report 
a quick first experiment in which participants read a vignette about a crime 
and then estimate the probability of guilt (or innocence) and how surprised 
they would be to find out that the suspect was innocent (or guilty).  The data 
show a high correlation between people’s estimations of probability and 
surprise. 
The relevance to forensic evidence is this: if people reveal a good 
correlation when expressing surprise and probability, then perhaps surprise 
would be a good way for forensic scientists to communicate probability.  
That is, rather than giving a statistic, or even an expression of probability,24 
an expression of surprise by a forensic scientist (“I would be extremely 
EXTREMELY surprised to learn that it was not the suspect’s fingerprint”) 
might be a good way to present the equivalent of statistical evidence.  And, 
if surprise does not work, perhaps there is some other attribute that would 
make a good substitution for probabilities. 
 
Aric Jenkins, Which is Safer: Airplanes or Cars?, FORTUNE (July 20, 2017), http://fortune.co
m/2017/07/20/are-airplanes-safer-than-cars/ (displaying recent statistics about auto-related 
fatalities for Americans).   
 22  D. Michael Risinger, Leveraging Surprise: What Standards of Proof Imply That We 
Want from Jurors, and What We Should Say to Them to Get It, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018).   
 23  Matthew Ginther & Edward K. Cheng, Surprise vs. Probability as a Metric for Proof, 
48 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).   
 24  Much research shows that people vary greatly in their interpretation of words like: 
probably, likely, etc.  See David V. Budescu & Thomas S. Wallsten, Processing Linguistic 
Probabilities: General Principles and Empirical Evidence, 32 PSYCHOL. LEARNING & 
MOTIVATION 275 (1995).   
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B. Explicit Explanation of Variability 
Attribute substitution relies on people’s unconscious strategy to answer 
questions using a method they already know.  Good explanations that draw 
on people’s pre-existing knowledge of category variability might also help 
them understand forensic conclusions. 
1. The Importance of Variability 
It turns out that factfinders are likely to already know about the 
importance of variability within a category for making inferences about that 
category.  In a classic study, participants were told to imagine that they were 
explorers who had discovered a new island in the Southeastern Pacific 
Ocean.  They encounter a member of the native population who has brown 
skin and is obese, a new type of bird that is blue in color and builds its nest 
in a eucalyptus tree, and a new element that conducts electricity and burns 
with a green flame.  When asked what percentage of the members of each 
category (human/bird/element) they thought would share the sample 
property, the answers ranged from very few (obesity) to nearly all (conduct 
electricity, burn with green flame).  Why?  Because the participants 
understood the underlying variability in those properties.25  Basic knowledge 
about category variability is useful but it depends on kinds of background 
knowledge of the category that people are not likely to have about 
fingerprints. 
2. Form of Explanation for Fingerprints 
When I talk about variability in fingerprints to my class, I say 
something like the following.  It is meant to evoke experiences and pre-
existing knowledge, describe the underlying “how” of fingerprint creation 
and use, and impart (I hope) an understanding of why there is not a one-and-
only perfect match. 
 
How many of you have ever had your fingerprints taken?26  If it 
was a while back, like when I first had mine done, there was a guy 
grasping my finger making sure that I rolled it evenly in the ink, 
and then that I used a constant pressure as I rolled my finger on 
the print paper.27  These days, of course, you place your fingers 
 
 25  Richard E. Nisbett, David H. Krantz, Christopher Jepson & Ziva Kunda, The Use of 
Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 339 (1983).  The 
research is also described in JOHN H. HOLLAND, KEITH J. HOLYOAK, RICHARD E. NISBETT & 
PAUL R. THAGARD, INDUCTION: PROCESSES OF INFERENCE, LEARNING, AND DISCOVERY (1986).   
 26  Currently, among the law students at the University of Virginia, it is nearly everyone.  
In the olden days, I used to joke that they did not have to admit to having had their fingerprints 
taken and some students seemed relieved.   
 27  Acting this out with body contortions is appreciated by the audience.   
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spread out, but not too much, on a scanner, and it tells you when 
you have good placement for the scan.  Okay, fine.  But now let’s 
consider your fingerprint as picked up by the cops—from a glass 
or a doorknob or a gun—which has been smudged by other later 
prints, or is on an uneven surface, or you touched or grabbed 
briefly while twisting as you ran.  That print, which ends up in the 
lab after the examiner “picks it up” (in some way that may also 
change the print), does not, cannot, look exactly the same as your 
pristine carefully placed original print.  In fact, even if you were 
to go back and try your best to create the exact same original print, 
you could get very close but it would not be exact.  So, your 
fingerprints vary from one time to the next—sometimes a little 
and sometimes a lot. 
 
Another thing about fingerprints is that although you may often 
hear that “everyone’s fingerprints are different,” we do not know 
that for a fact.  We certainly do not have the fingerprints of 
everyone in the world on file to compare.  Plus, sometimes we 
only have partial prints.  And we certainly cannot rule out that 
some parts of someone’s fingerprint might be identical to some 
parts of someone else’s fingerprint. 
 
But even if we could say that everyone’s prints are different, we 
might still be in trouble because we do not know whether they are 
different enough to distinguish them.  Because if your fingerprints 
differ every time and place you leave them, and other people’s 
fingerprints differ every time they leave them, how do we know 
that even if your actual fingers are different, that the prints you 
end up leaving might not look close to identical?  And that’s the 
problem—there is a fingerprint there on the gun—and it looks like 
it could be from my finger or from yours.28 
 
Perhaps something like this could trigger better reasoning about the 
comparison disciplines (e.g., both the ones in which people are less 
experienced like fingerprints or ballistics, and more experienced like 
shoeprints or handwriting).  Then each discipline could supplement training 
with domain-specific information. 
 
 28  For a description of between versus within variability, see WILLIAM THOMPSON, JOHN 
BLACK, ANIL JAIN & JOSEPH KADANE, AAAS, FORENSIC SCIENCE ASSESSMENTS: A QUALITY 
AND GAP ANALYSIS—LATENT FINGERPRINT EXAMINATION 17–27 (Sept. 15, 2017), https://
mcmprodaaas.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/reports/Latent%20Fingerprint%20Report%20
FINAL%209_14.pdf?i9xGS_EyMHnIPLG6INIUyZb66L5cLdlb.   
SPELLMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2018  1:05 PM 
838 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:827 
1. Analogy: Explanation Plus Substitution 
Another way to tap into using peoples’ pre-existing knowledge of 
variability to bolster their understanding of likelihood ratios in forensic 
evidence is to use analogy.  Using analogy has characteristics of both 
explanation and attribute substitution.  To use analogy to communicate to 
another person, we need to find a domain that is analogous to forensic 
science statistics (the “target” domain) in ways we care about—e.g., has 
likelihoods, base rates, variability, and uncertainty—but that the learner has 
prior experience with, and, preferably, might even have some pre-existing 
expertise (the “source” domain).29  Something like face recognition30 might 
work. 
Step one: Describe some basic important features of the target 
domain—forensic comparison processes—that might be unknown to the 
listener.  (For fingerprints, see example description in Part IV, Section B, 
above.) 
Step two: Remind the learner of important (relevant) aspects of the 
source domain.  Something like: “Now comparing fingerprints seems very 
complicated, but it is quite similar to something you do every day, something 
you are an expert at, but do not even think about much—and that is 
recognizing faces.  You know what you look like, but you are probably aware 
that when you look in the mirror from one day (or one hour) to the next, you 
do not look exactly the same.  There are bad hair days, bags-under-eyes days, 
what’s-wrong-with-my-skin days, and all sorts of intermediate variations.  
Yet, you do not have any trouble recognizing yourself in the mirror.  Nor do 
you have trouble recognizing your close friends, or family, or people you see 
daily even though, in fact, they look different every day.” 
Step three: Draw out the important similarities for understanding the 
target domain.  “But now consider someone you do not know well or have 
not seen in a while who you run into at a party or, worse yet, a college 
reunion.  You remember what Nikki looked like 30 years ago, but is that 
person Nikki or Jane?  Would someone who looked like Nikki 30 years ago 
look like this person in front of you now?  Or would she look entirely 
different?  This is one side of the problem of variability—she could look 
 
 29  Mary L. Gick & Keith J. Holyoak, Analogical Problem Solving, 12 COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 306 (1980); Laura R. Novick, Analogical Transfer, Problem Similarity, and 
Expertise, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 510 (1988).  For 
a description of these and related analogy studies as relevant to judicial decision-making, see 
Barbara A. Spellman, Judges, Expertise, and Analogy, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL 
DECISION-MAKING 149 (David E. Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010) and Barbara A. 
Spellman and Frederick Schauer, Analogy, Expertise, and Experience, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 
(2017).   
 30  Of course, face recognition could be a tricky example to use because it might be 
relevant to the case at hand.  Perhaps snowflakes?   
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many different ways now—some easy to recognize, some not.  Then there is 
the other side of the problem—could it be someone else who looks like this 
person in front of you now?  Probably yes, if Nikki did not have a lot of 
distinctive characteristics; but probably no if she had one blue eye, one 
brown eye, and was six foot ten.” 
This exposition provides the building blocks for understanding 
likelihood ratios without ever saying “likelihood ratio.”  And it is easy to add 
information about how the number of people at the reunion (i.e., the size of 
the relevant comparison population) would affect one’s belief about how 
likely it could be someone other than Nikki. 
2. Implicit Learning Tasks: Experiencing Variability 
This last suggestion for helping people understand forensic statistics is 
the most speculative.  It involves a learn-by-doing task that should not need 
verbal explanation of forensics at the outset. 
In the 1980’s, psychologists ran many different experimental tasks to 
try to understand how people go from seeing instances of categories (e.g., 
lots of birds, lots of hypothetical Martians) to inducing mental 
representations of the average member and the variability within the 
categories.31  One set of studies asked participants to imagine two artists: 
Smith and Wilson.  They each designed abstract art that consisted of black 
and white squares (on a 10x10 grid).  The participants’ task was to 
distinguish the work of the two artists.  The “artwork” was created by: (a) 
creating one basic non-viewed 10x10 grid of black/white squares for each 
artist; these represented each artist’s prototypical work; then (b) distorting 
each prototype by changing some percentage of squares from black to white 
and vice versa; these represent the work the artist produces for viewing.32  In 
some variants of the studies, one artist’s work was all fairly similar (i.e., few 
squares were changed) whereas the other artist’s work varied a lot (i.e., many 
squares were changed).  After seeing a few examples of the art, choosing 
which artist they thought it belonged to, and getting feedback on their 
decision accuracy, participants then saw many more examples and had to 
guess which artist they thought produced it, this time without feedback.33 
How is this study relevant here?  When participants had to categorize 
the paintings, they acted as if they were using likelihood ratios based on the 
number of color switches from the prototype.  That is, many of the paintings 
 
 31  For a review, see Douglas L. Medin, Concepts and Categories, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
1469 (1989). 
 32  Lisbeth S. Fried & Keith J. Holyoak, Induction of Category Distributions: A 
Framework for Classification Learning, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY 
& COGNITION 234, 241–43 (1984).   
 33  Id. at 247–48.   
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could have been made by either artist, but the participants categorized each 
one based on the likelihood of it being from a particular artist given their 
knowledge of the variability in the two artists’ paintings.  Recall that the 
participants had never seen the artists’ prototypes; rather, the variability is 
induced from the training examples.34 
One potential strength of this procedure is that it is more like learning 
about relative frequencies than about probabilities.  In many judgment tasks, 
people are better at evaluating information when it is presented as 
frequencies rather than probabilities.35 
This study demonstrates implicit learning of category distributions.  In 
most laboratory tasks like this one (i.e., category induction from abstract 
highly variable examples), participants cannot explain the criteria they are 
using in making their decisions.  I do not know whether explaining to them 
that what they have learned to do is very similar statistically to what forensic 
analysts do would help them to understand the statistics or the process.  But 
it might. 
V.   SUMMING UP 
In this Article, I suggest two major things.  First, I jump on the 
bandwagon of doubts about some of the ways forensic comparison evidence 
is presented to factfinders and I add some psychological backing to some of 
those doubts.  Second, I propose that there are several ways, coming from a 
variety of areas within cognitive psychology, to teach factfinders about 
variability, to relate it to things they already know, and to use that as 
scaffolding to increase understanding of, and competence in using, forensic 
statistical evidence. 
 
 
 34  Id.   
 35  The usefulness of frequencies is shown often in the work of Gerd Gigerenzer.  For 
application to DNA match statistics, see Koehler, supra note 7.   
